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1. Introduction 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are software or hardware products that automate the 
analysis process of traffic on a network or a host. and they are a complementary security 
tool in computer networks; it can be deployed at different points depending on the 
application, host or network segment to be monitored. Accordingly to its location, the IDS 
must be parameterized in a different way, for example, an IDS located in a Demilitarized 
Zone (DMZ) must be more flexible than an IDS located inside the internal network to reduce 
false alarms or to avoid system overload, allowing intrusions without generating an alarm. 
Likewise the IDS can receive different kinds of attacks if it is located in a DMZ or in the 
intranet zone.  
Due to the increasing rate of attacks, Intrusion Detection Systems has become a 
complementary and mandatory security tool to any organization, and in addition it is useful 
to perform forensic analysis procedures in order to complement the IDS use. An IDS 
performs passive monitoring and captures information to be analyzed subsequently, it can 
launch an alarm to a server or send an email warning about possible intrusions but it cannot 
modify its environment, otherwise it is named Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). An IPS 
responds in real time if an intrusion is detected, the IPS takes an action modifying its 
environment; it could modify the firewall by closing a suspicious connection, or reconfigure 
the router, etc. 
In the last two decades many research studies about technologies, architectures, 
methodologies and technologies have been proposed in order to increase the IDS 
effectiveness. One of them is the agent technology. Agents offer many advantages to IDS 
like scalability, independence, solution to complex tasks, reduction of network traffic, etc. 
For these reasons, agents are appropriate but they have inherent security drawbacks and 
they must be tackled. There are four risk scenarios: agent against agent, agent against 
platform, others against agent and platform against agent. The most difficult problem to face 
is the last one because the platform can be accessed by the agent code and it could 
eventually modify it. The internal security of a system is treated in few research works and 
it is a critical situation because it is a barrier for attackers, and one of their first challenges is 
to cheat or attack defence systems. 
In previous studies (Páez et al., 2005), many IDS architectures based on agents were 
analyzed, and it was possible to conclude that it was necessary to propose techniques to 
protect internally an agent based IDS, by securing its different entities. The new IDS’s 
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architecture proposed is named Laocoonte and it is a work on progress, using an open 
framework developed in the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana named BESA (Behaviour-
oriented, Event-driven and Social-based agent framework) (González et al., 2003). 
BESA is a platform developed in Java in order to take advantage of its portability. BESA 
allows the deployment of a Multi agent Systems (MAS), its environment is object oriented 
and offers multithreading and transparency in communications among entities. The abstract 
model of BESA is based on three fundamentals concepts: Behaviour-Oriented, Event-Driven 
and Social-Based. Moreover BESA uses a set of containers located in each host on the 
system, and each container contains several agents performing specific functions. Likewise, 
each agent has a set of guards; each guard has two associated procedures. The first one is 
executed automatically by the firing mechanism to verify a boolean condition. The second is 
executed by behaviour when the guard has fired. The code implementing behaviour is 
generic and can be written independently of the agent specificity. Behaviour receives an 
event, and depending on its type executes a program. In this way, the internal structure of 
each agent can be constructed. 
2. Important 
An IDS is a software or hardware tool which allows to detect and warn about an attack or 
intrusion from authorized or non authorized users to the system which is being protected. 
The intrusion can be from inside or outside the protected system and it can be intentional or 
accidental. An intrusion is an unauthorized or non wanted activity that puts in risk any 
security service like confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of the information or 
computer resource. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Basic IDS architecture 
The basic architecture of an IDS consists of three main modules: The information collection 
module, detection module and Response module (Páez et al., 2006). The information 
collection module contains: an event generator, an event collection sub-module and a 
reference to detect an intrusion (Database of attacks, behaviour profile, etc.). Fig. 1 illustrates 
the basic architecture of an IDS. 
The event generator sub module can be the operating system, the network or an application. 
The events generator sub module sends the information to the event collection sub module, 
and then it sends the traffic to the detection module.  
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The detection module has an analyzer or sensor which decides if actually there is an 
intrusion. Finally, the detection module sends the suspicious traffic to the response module 
which acts accordingly, based on a policy database. 
There are many ways to classify an IDS [Debar et al., 1999]. Debar et al classify IDS´s 
accordingly to the detection method, the behaviour on detection, the audit source location 
and usage frequency. 
The main concern of researchers in Intrusion Detection Systems is to avoid false negative and 
positive events because they are common drawbacks to IDS’s, a false positive occurs when the 
IDS detects an intrusion and reacts accordingly to its configuration but actually is not 
malicious traffic, and a false positive occurs when the IDS does not alert about a real intrusion. 
Both factors affect negatively the IDS but maybe the second one is the most dangerous because 
it would allow an attack, but the first one would reduce the IDS’ reliability and distracts 
network administrators from real issues. Thus, an IDS must to minimize false negative and 
positive events and keep updated the system. Moreover, a well configured IDS is also another 
resource to perform forensic analysis through its log files, and depending on its location it can 
offer many information about inside or outside attacks. An IDS is a complementary security 
tool; in neither case, it would replace other security tools like firewalls, antivirus, etc. 
Moreover false positive and negatives events, there are many other problems regarding 
IDS’s such as evasion, in this case an intruder may try to avoid detection by fragmenting 
communication packets, in this way, the signature database would not match what the IDS 
expects to see. Fragmented packets are put back together into its original form and the 
attack is performed without being detected by the IDS. Another problem to solve is related 
to cryptographic techniques; because a network based IDS cannot access raw data and it 
could not detect a possible attack or intrusion. Finally, depending on the used technology 
other problems could arise inside the IDS.  
We have focused our work in an IDS based on autonomous and mobile agents. Agents have 
many characteristics appropriates to IDS (Balasubramaniyan et al., 1998) because they can 
perform simple tasks individually without supervision (i.e. traffic monitoring; event 
correlation of results), they can solve complex tasks such as detect an intrusion or attack. 
Agents can be classified according to their mobility, they can be static or mobile; according 
to their behaviour, they can be deliberative or reactive and according to their attributes, they 
can be autonomous, cooperative or intelligent. By combining these properties, they can be 
classified as: collaborative agents, interface agents, information or internet agents, hybrids or 
heterogeneous agents. 
On the other hand, mobile agents have inherent security drawbacks due to their nature, 
because of this its use has not been widely spread in industrial environments. These security 
problems can be summarized in the following four scenarios (Fig. 2): agent against agent, 
agent against platform, others against platform and platform against agent (Jansen, 2000). 
These scenarios have common attacks and they are: masquerade, denial of service and 
unauthorized access; A masquerade attack occurs when an entity (platform, agent, etc.) 
claims the identity of another entity in order to impersonate it and obtain access to services 
and resources; A denial of service attack occurs when an entity consumes an excessive amount 
of computing resources; this attack can be launched intentionally or unintentionally. The 
denial of service can occur on a resource (i.e. printer) or on information; An unauthorized 
access attack occurs when an entity access resources' information to which it has not granted 
permission. Additionally, attacks from agent to agent scenario can suffer repudiation attacks, 
this occurs when an entity which have participated in a transaction or communication, later it 
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denies its participation. In the case of attacks from others entities to agent, exists the copy and 
replay attack, it means that a malicious entity intercepts an agent or agent's message and then 
tries to copy the agent or message in order to clone or retransmit it. Finally, in the platform to 
agent scenario, the eavesdropping attack is a passive attack and occurs when an entity, in this 
case the platform, intercepts and monitors secret communications. 
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Fig. 2. Different attacks in an agent environment 
There are some proposals to protect both agents and platform (Jansen, 2000) (Collberg, 2002) 
(Knoll et al., 2001), but many of them have general purpose to any agent based systems. 
Some of these proposals are not viable to all systems, because they add overload to the 
system or use cryptographic techniques which have significant drawbacks in response time. 
The most difficult problem to solve is the attack from a platform against agents. This is 
because the platform has access to the data, code and results of the agents located on it. In 
this way, if a host is malicious, it can perform an active or passive attack. In the case of a 
passive attack, the host obtains secret information as electronic money, private keys, 
certificates or secrets that the agent uses for its own security requests.  On the other hand, to 
perform an active attack, the host would be able to corrupt or to modify the code or the state of 
the agents. A malicious host can also carry out a combination of passive and active attacks, for 
example, by analyzing the operation of the agent and applying reverse engineering to 
introduce subtle changes, so the agent shows malicious behaviour and reports false results.  
Some authors consider two phases in a Mobile Agents System (MAS), transferring phase and 
running phase (Xiaobin, 2004). Thus, an agent could be attacked either when it is moving or 
when it is located in a malicious host performing its job. In an IDS based on mobile agents the 
threats are transferred, but they must be treated in a particular way. It is important to provide 
internal security in order to avoid or detect an attack but without adding overload to the 
system and using simple techniques which do not consume excessive response time.  
www.intechopen.com
An Agent Based Intrusion Detection System with Internal Security 
 
101 
We have centred our research in the worst scenario: attacks from platform against agent. 
Several IDS based on agent architectures have been analyzed in order to investigate about 
its protection mechanisms, in order to provide internal security, because all of them must 
face the same issues. Among them are: IDA [Asaka et al., 1999], MA-IDS [Shao-Chun et al., 
2003], JAM [Salvatore et al., 1997] and Sparta system [Kruegel et al., 2001] and others 
systems based on agents.  
2.1 IDA´s architecture 
The IDA´s (Intrusion Detection Agent system) architecture (Fig. 3) uses a sensor agent  that 
resides at a node in search of an MLSI (Marks Left by Suspected Intruder) from the system's 
log; and upon discovery, notifies the Manager who dispatches a tracing agent to the host 
where the MLSI was detected. This agent activates an information-gathering agent. The 
information-gathering agent collects, in a independent way, information related to the MLSI 
on the target system. The information-gathering agent returns to the Manager with its 
results and logs them on a bulletin board. The tracing agent moves to the next targeted 
system and activates a new information gathering agent. Meanwhile, the bulletin board 
integrates information collected about the intrusion, using the gathered information from 
several involved agents. So, bulletin board and message board are a common use area and 
can be accessed by tracing agents and information-gathering agents. The manager 
accumulates, analyzes and weighs the information entered on the bulletin board by the 
mobile agents and, if the weights exceed a threshold, it concludes that an intrusion has 
occurred and issues an alarm. 
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Fig. 3. The IDA´s architecture 
2.2 MAID’s architecture 
The MAID’s (Mobile Agents Intrusion Detection System) architecture is a distributed IDS which 
includes a Manager, Assistant Monitor Agent, Response Monitor Agent and a Host Monitoring 
Agent. There is a Monitor Agent (MA) in each host. If an agent detects an intrusion, it reports it 
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directly to the Manager. The host Monitor Agent can request aid to the manager. If a Manager 
receives an Assistant's request, it will send an Assistant MA to patrol the network in order to 
gather information, and thus to determine if some suspicious activities in different hosts can be 
combined to carry out a distributed intrusion. Finally, the manager analyzes the gathered 
information and if it detects a plausible distribution intrusion it will dispatch a Response MA. 
The manager is a central point of correlation and therefore, if it is located by any attacker, the 
system would be in a dangerous situation. The mobile agents (Assistant MA and the Response 
MA) are encrypted using a symmetric key algorithm with a one-time session key. Then, this 
session key is encrypted using a public key algorithm, this turns the MAIDS's runtime 
environment slow. The MAID’s architecture is shown in the Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. MAID’s architecture 
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Fig. 5. JAM’s architecture 
2.3 JAM’s architecture 
The JAM’s (Java Agents for Meta-learning) architecture (Fig. 5) applies learning and meta-
learning agents to distributed database sites and the system's configuration is maintained by 
a Configuration File Manager (CFM), which is a server that provides information about the 
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participating data sites and log events, and the CFM is in charge of keeping the state of the 
system up-to-date.  
2.4 Sparta’s architecture 
The Sparta (Security Policy Adaptation Reinforced Through Agents) system uses correlation 
mechanisms among agents in order to identify and relate suspect events in a distributed 
manner. Three different types of users can be recognized by a host in this system: 
Administrators, regular users and owners of agents. Moreover, each node belonging to the 
system, has a Loacal even generator (sensor), event storage component, mobile agent 
platform and agent launch and query unit (optional). Sparta can detect network intrusion in 
a dynamic environment using a pattern language (Event Definition Language-EDL) to 
express intrusions in a declarative way. Each host has at least a sensor (local event 
generator), a storage component and the mobile agent platform installed (Fig. 6). Sensors 
monitor interesting occurrences on the network or at the host itself and this information is 
stored in a local database for later retrieval by agents; the mobile agent subsystem provides 
an execution environment, communication layer, clock synchronization and a directory 
service.  
The Sparta’s architecture provides mechanisms to protect agents and platforms 
implementing a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Agents are encrypted and signed during its 
transportation and authenticated on arrival. 
The use of a public key introduces delay on the system, which is not a desirable attribute on 
an IDS.  
We have analyzed others proposals [Yonggang Chu et al., 2005], [Zaman & Carray, 2009] 
but none provide internal security or there is no information is available. So, we propose 
complementary techniques in order to avoid and/or prevent an intrusion or attack 
providing internal security to an agent based IDS. Few authors treat the internal security of 
an IDS and it is in our opinion an important factor because it is one of the first barriers that 
an intruder would find when trying to access a network. So, the IDS become a susceptible 
objective to be attacked.  
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Fig. 6. SPARTA’s architecture 
Our proposed system is named Laocoonte. Laocoonte is a distributed and hierarchic IDS 
based on AAFID project [Balasubramaniyan et al., 1998] but we have made modifications to 
the architecture in order to increase the internal security level. We have added Cooperative 
Itinerant Agents (CIA) as an intermediary agent to request for a particular mark, all entities 
are mobile inside a network segment. Moreover we use different techniques to prove the 
integrity on central point of failure, such as transceivers or monitors. Laocoonte uses 
autonomous and mobile agents but its main characteristic is its internal security.  
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3. Laocoonte’s architecture 
Laocoonte is a hierarchical IDS with three main levels. Each level has different entities 
performing a particular job in a cooperative manner, but the entities which belong to the 
same level cannot communicate directly among them. Each entity is an agent but with 
different characteristics and duties. Fig. 7 depicts Laocoonte’s architecture. In the lower 
lever are located collector agents, in the middle level are located the transceivers and in the 
higher level are located the monitors. Finally, there is an interface which is not considered as 
component of the architecture but it is necessary for the system administrator in order to set 
different parameters on each entity to configure the system. 
On each host, there are one or more collector agents, monitoring the information which 
travels on the network or host. Each collector agent is specialized on a particular kind of 
traffic (TCP, UDP, ICMP). Collector agents determine if a determined traffic is malicious 
based on a database of attacks. When it occurs, the collector agent sends this information to 
the transceiver. So the only two functions performed by a collector agent are: monitoring 
and report its findings. 
  
         
         
              
M T A Monitor Transceiver CollectorAgent Cooperative Itinerant  
Agent 
  
 
 
 
Host 
1 
UI 
M M M 
T T T T TT T
. . . 
Cross 
verification 
CIA 1 
CIA 2 CIA 3 CIA n 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
 
 
 
Host 2 
 
 
 
Host 3 
 
 
 
Host 1 
 
 
 
Host 2 
 
 
 
Host 1 
 
 
 
Host 2 
 
 
 
 
Network segment 1
 
 
 
 
 
Network segment 2
 
 
 
 
 
Network segment n
Higher  
level 
Intermediate 
level 
Lower 
level 
 
Fig. 7. Laocoonte’s architecture 
Transceivers are agents located in the intermediate level, and they must take the findings of 
the collector agents and perform correlation of events in order to identify a possible attack 
or intrusion in the host on which it is located. There is only a transceiver for each host and it 
can detect an intrusion or attack in a local way. Moreover, a transceiver can perform control 
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functions on collector agents (create, stop... etc.). If the transceiver identifies an attack, it 
reports this information to the corresponding monitor. 
Monitors are agents located in the upper level of the infrastructure, and they are in charge of 
controlling the transceivers. When a Monitor creates a transceiver, sends it to a host and 
waits for results. The Monitor collects the information from its transceivers and performs 
high correlation functions, in this way it can detect a distributed attack because the 
information comes from different network segments. A Monitor could depend of another 
Monitor; it is because in large distributed systems a monitor could receive large amounts of 
information. Thus, to avoid any overload it is necessary to create another level. 
Cooperative Itinerant Agents (CIA) are mobile entities and they are created by a Monitor. 
CIA agents are part of the internal security scheme. It must ask for a particular mark to a 
transceiver located in each host and sends the response to the monitor, and then it continues 
its itinerary inside a network segment. There is an exception in the upper level because 
monitors do not have another superior entity performing control activities. In this case, the 
CIA agent must travel among different network segments to ask for the mark to each 
monitor. 
We have discussed the general IDS architecture. Next we will present and explain the 
internal security scheme. 
4. Laocoonte's security scheme 
The objective of this proposal is to ensure the integrity of a mobile agent which could be 
attacked by an untrusted platform. The proposed technique, consist on the inclusion of a 
marks matrix inside the code of the entities which are going to be verified (transceivers and 
monitors), and also store a copy of the verifying entities. The matrix is composed by a set 
number of cells which can be determined by the protected hosts' processing capabilities. In 
each cell of the matrix there is a prime number (sub-mark). The Monitor which will behave 
as a verifier, informs the cooperative agent which are the coordinates that are to be verified 
from the matrix; in this way what is really requested is not a mark itself, but the result of an 
operation between primer numbers (the sub-marks) which are located in the given 
coordinates. The sub-marks involved in the operation are different every time a request is 
generated, and every time a set of coordinates is used, the position in the matrix gets 
blocked from being used again in the subsequent processes. The result is then masked 
though a module function and a randomly generated coefficient value generated by the 
verified entity. when the cooperative agent warns the Monitor about its transfer to a host, 
the Monitor sends the coordinates which will be used in the operations, the CIA agent 
serves as an intermediary and sends the petition to the entity that is going to be verified 
(transceiver or monitor), then the entity returns the product of the requested sub-marks. 
The reason to use module functions is to mask the result of the operation performed on the 
given sub-marks. Also the prime number product increments security by means that if the 
result is captured by an attacker, it would not be trivial to find the values, and then 
protecting the information that is going to be received by the verifying entity, in this case the 
Monitor which controls the verified entity. The Monitor knows the module that has been 
applied to the verified entity, and then it would only have to repeat the product of the two 
sub-marks and then apply the correspondent module, and finally compare the results. 
The Monitor's request is also performed using randomly generated prime numbers as 
coefficients from a previously established module. The result of the product of such given 
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prime numbers and the random variable are in fact the coordinates of the sub-masks in the 
matrix. In this way if the result is intercepted, the attacker would not be able to identify the 
requested coordinates. 
The procedure since the creation of the entity (monitor or transceiver), through the 
verification of it is as follows: 
1. The Monitor generates the transceiver. 
2. The Monitor assigns the prime number matrix; it inserts it as a mark to the transceiver 
and keeps a copy of the matrix and its contents. 
3. The Monitor generates a prime number x, which will be used as module for the 
function (1). The transceiver also stores this value. 
4. The Monitor sends the transceiver to the correspondent host. 
5. When the CIA agent announces the host's change, the Monitor generates the random 
numbers and solves function (1). In this way it sends the masked coordinates of the sub-
marks matrix. 
6. The CIA agent requests the result of function (2) to the verified entity (the transceiver), 
giving it the masked coordinates generated by the Monitor. 
7. The transceiver gets the module x of the given coordinates. With this information it can 
obtain the values of the sub-marks in those coordinates. 
8. The transceiver generates t as a multiplicative factor and solves function (2) with the 
given sub-marks. then it send the results to the CIA agent 
9. The CIA agent resends the results to the Monitor. 
10. The Monitor receives the result from the CIA agent and applies the module y  having 
S1. Then solves the product of the sub-marks and having then S2. 
11. The Monitor then compares S1 and S2. If the values match, then there is a high 
probability that the transceiver has not been compromised. 
And now we proceed to present the mathematical definition of the variables used in 
Laocoonte's proposal. 
Being M a matrix of dimensions fxc , where f means rows and c columns, and the set 
represented by ( , )i jf c  indicates a cell in the matrix where  ( ), (0.. ,0.. )i j f c= . In each cell a 
randomly generated prime number is stored by the corresponding Monitor. Each prime 
number is a sub-mark of the main mark (the matrix). The verifying entity (the monitor 
which controls the CIA Agent and the transceiver) will request a set of sub-marks in order to 
test the integrity of the agent (transceiver or monitor). The requested sub-marks will be 
different each time the request is generated (because of the actual blocking of previously 
used coordinates). when the CIA agent arrives to a host, the Monitor sends the coordinates 
of the sub-marks that wants to verify. The CIA agent issues a request to the transceiver, and 
when it gets an answer it resends it to the Monitor. The Monitor uses the information on the 
request in function (1):  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 1 2 1 3 2 4 2, , , ,  , * ,k n n nf x x p f x p c x p f x p c x p f x p c= ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + … + ∗ +  (1) 
Where x is an integer greater or equal to zero. The value of x corresponds to a fixated value, 
randomly generated by the Monitor and known by the transceiver. This value represents the 
module used by the Monitor to mask the values. The values 1 2 3, , , ,k np p p p p  are integer 
random variables generated by the monitor, and the variables 1 1 2 2,  ,  ,  ,f c f c  correspond to the 
two sets of coordinates of the sub-marks in the matrix generated randomly by the Monitor 
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every time the cooperative agent issues a request of marks to the transceiver. In some cases 
the set of requested sub-marks can be more than two. This coordinates are given to the 
transceiver and it calculates the correspondent module to get the sub-marks from the matrix. 
Knowing the coordinates the sub-marks values 1 2,w w are multiplied in function (2):  
 ( ) ( )2 1 2{ ( )}f y y t w w= ∗ + ∗  (2) 
Where y corresponds to a fixed number which represents the previously assigned module. 
This model is known by the Monitor and it is used to mask the sub-marks; in this way there 
will not be inferred information about the given values of the sub-marks. Parameter t is a 
randomly generated integer by the transceiver every time it uses function (2). The agent 
receives this parameter and sends it back to the Monitor. The Monitor then applies the 
 
 
Fig. 8. Sequences diagram among entities for marks’ verification  
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accorded module function and compares it to the given value obtained of applying the same 
module to the product of the requested values. If the result of the module function does not 
match, it means that the transceiver has been compromised and it must be considered as 
malicious. Otherwise, there is a high probability that the integrity of the agent has not been 
compromised. 
Fig. 8 presents a sequence diagram which depicts the processes performed by each entity. 
The proposed integrity verification process of a transceiver or a monitor can be considered 
as a Zero-Knowledge Proof or ZKP. The concept was introduced in 1985 for systems 
verification identity [U. Fiege et al., 1985], but it can be applied to cryptographic 
applications. A ZKP is an interactive protocol between two parts, which gives a test, a tester 
(verified entity, in our case, a transceiver or a monitor) and the verifier of the test (the 
monitor). The Verified entity must convince the verifier that it knows the answer to a given 
theorem without revealing any kind of additional information [Yang & Liu, 2005]. This 
means, an entity probes its identity by showing it knows a secret, without giving the secret 
away, this is particularly useful in the case the messages are being intercepted, since the 
attacker will not receive any information related to the secret. Another important 
characteristic is that the messages are always different and randomly generated in order that 
the attacker could not memorize a concrete sequence. 
4.1 Generating the matrix 
In the following section we will describe the process used by the Monitor to generate the 
sub-mark matrix and the actual verification of the sub-marks. After generation the 
transceiver, the Monitor creates a matrix of size f by c which will be used as a mark. this 
matrix must be stored in the Monitor and in the transceiver and it must be unique for each 
transceiver. For the example we are going to present, the matrix will be of size 4 by 4 (16 
sub-marks) and two sub-marks will be requested.  It also will be generated a module (x) 
which will remain constant during the process to be used on function (1). Several additional 
random values will be generated to multiply the module and to pick the two sets of 
coordinates from the matrix.  
For simplicity, small values have been chosen for the given example. It is also possible for a 
CIA agent to request more than two sets of coordinates (sub-marks) to verify. In this case the 
Monitor must provide the different sets of coordinates; also the transceiver must get such 
values in order to replace them in function (2). 
The set of modules and the values of the sub-marks in the matrix are:  
1. Sub-marks Matrix: 
 
 
Table 1. Transceiver Sub-marks 
www.intechopen.com
An Agent Based Intrusion Detection System with Internal Security 
 
109 
The Monitor generates the transceiver, the sub-marks matrix, the prime numbers in the 
matrix (Table 1), module x and y. After this the Monitor sends the transceiver to the 
corresponding host. These given values remain constant and will be used later in the 
verification process. 
2. The values given to the modules in this example are (Table 2):  
 
Variable Value Description 
x 17 Module of function (1) 
y 53 Module of function (2) 
Table 2. Fixed Values 
3. The Monitor's randomly generated values, used to issue a sub-mark request to the 
transceiver (for this example)  are (Table 3): 
 
Variable Value Description 
P1 37 
P2 13 
p3 7 
p4 23 
Random values that multiplies the module of function ( 1 ). 
t 53 Random value, generated by the transceiver which 
multiplies the module in function ( 2 ). 
f1 0 Raw coordinate of the first sub-mark (w1) to be verified. f1 
< m (m is the number of rows in the matrix) 
c1 2 Column coordinate of the first sub-mark (w1) to be 
verified. c1 < n (n is the number of columns in the matrix) 
f2 2 Raw coordinate of the first sub-mark (w2) to be verified. f2 
< m (m is the number of rows in the matrix) 
c2 3 Column coordinate of the first sub-mark (w2) to be 
verified. c2 < n (n is the number of columns in the matrix) 
Table 3. Randomly Generated Values 
The sub-marks in the coordinates 1 1f ,c (0,2)=  y 2 2f , c (2,3)= ; correspond to the values 
36599 and 21991 in the sub-marks matrix. 
The Monitor generates the random values ( )1 2 3 4 1 1 2p ,p ,p ,p ,f ,c ,c  and applies function (1): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 1 3 2 4 2f x { x p f , x p c , x p f , x p c }= ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ +  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 { 17 37 0 , 17 13 2 , 17 7 2 , 17 23 3 }f x = ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ +  
( )1 {629,223,121,394}f x =  
The Monitor gives the result to the CIA agent, and the CIA agent resends it to the 
transceiver. The transceiver uses those values and applies the corresponding module in 
order to obtain the coordinates of the requested sub-marks: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ 629 , 223 , 121 , 394 }x x x xC mod mod mod mod=  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )17 17 17 17{ 629 , 223 , 121 , 394 }C mod mod mod mod=  
{0,2,2,3}C =  
The values of the sub-marks in the given coordinates 1 2( , )w w  are respectively (36599 y 
21991). The transceiver uses function (2). For this example the values will be y = 53 y t = 
3571, y is generated by the Monitor and t is generated by the transceiver.  
( )2 1 2{( ) ( ))}f y y t w w= ∗ + ∗  
( )2 {(53 3571) (36599 21991))}f y = ∗ + ∗  
( )2 {805037872}f y =  
The CIA agent receives the answer from the transceiver and resends it to the Monitor. The 
Monitor uses the value of y and obtains the module of the given value: 
( )1 { 2 }yS f mod=  
( ){ }1 53805037872S mod=  
1 {43}S =  
Then it gets the module of the product of the two requested sub-marks: 
( )2 { 36599 21991 }yS mod= ∗  
( )2 53{ 804848609 }S mod=  
2 {43}S =  
After getting S2, it verifies if the result is equal to the module of the product of the two sub-
marks (36599, 21991), this is if 1 2S S=  then it means that there is a high probability that the 
transceiver has not been compromised. 
For the example we have used a four rows by four columns matrix, in this case the number 
of possible combinations of a couple of marks which can be obtained is given by (3): 
 ( ) ( )
! 16!
120
! ! 2! 16 2 !
n
w n w
= =− −     (3) 
Each time a CIA agent issues a reuest for sub-marks, the monitor randomly picks the cells 
coordinates. With a 16 cell matrix there are 120 possibilities of obtaining the same pair of 
sub-marks, thus the probability that a set of sub-marks are repeated on a request is 1/120. If 
the number of requested marks is greater than two, the probability that an attacker could 
guess the sub-marks is smaller. If the matrix grows (more rows and columns), the 
probability gets closer to 0. Table 4 presents the different sets of combinations that can be 
achieved for matrixes size 16, 32, 64 y 128, by choosing 2, 3 or 4 sub-marks. 
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Cells 2 sub-marks 3 sub-marks 4 sub-marks 
16 120 560 1.820 
32 496 4.960 35.960 
64 2.016 41.664 635.376 
128 8.128 341.376 10.668.000 
Table 4. Possible Combinations by Number of cells in the matrix and sub-marks to be 
verified 
Table 4 shows that the probability to find a set of 4 sub-marks from a 128 cells matrix is 
minimal (1/10’668.000). Accordingly to the amount of requested sub-marks and the length 
of the prime numbers (the actual sub-marks) special care must be taken because the 
returned value of function (2) may be too large and generate a stack overflow. The next 
graphic is the representation of previous values on the table, presenting a logarithmic 
projection. 
 
 
Graphic 1. Number of cells and sub-marks to be proved 
5. The BESA framework 
BESA (Behavior-oriented, Event-driven, and Social-based agent framework) is a Multi-
Agent Development Framework, which allows multithreading, and is FIPA (Foundation for 
Intelligent Physical Agents) compliant; this allows interoperability with other platforms. 
BESA is based on three main concepts: Behavior-oriented, Event-driven, and Social-based, 
behavior allows and agent to encapsulate the needed characteristics that will guarantee the 
fulfillment of a well defined purpose, by forming cooperative societies and giving as a result 
agents composed by a set of concurrent behaviors; Event-driven means that the agent must 
react accordingly to its knowledge to a change in the environment. Finally the social-based 
concept, allows that different entities interact forming microsocieties. The way in which 
internal cooperation is achieved is by the implementation of a social mediator agent which 
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also works as an external representative. BESA is structured in three different levels: the 
agent level, the social level and the system level. 
Agent level: at this level the behavior of the agents is specified as well as the events of the 
environment. An agent is composed by a channel, a set of behaviors and a state. Each agent 
uses mutual exclusion synchronization, in this way it avoids concurrency issues. 
Social level: At this level the mediator agent is incorporated in order to form the actual 
abstraction of the intermediate levels. The mediator agent is a facilitator of the cooperative 
work between agents and acts as a receiver o thrower of events.  
System level: At this level the life cycle of the agents is specified and managed. 
6. Laocoonte’s implementation on BESA 
An agent based system implemented in BESA is a distributed system composed by one or 
many containers which are instantiated on a physical or virtual machine. Each container is 
processing space in itself, with a local administrator which supports the communication 
among agents and provides yellow and white pages services. The white pages service is 
used by the administrator to register the instantiation of an agent in the container. The 
yellow pages service is used by the contained agents to publish its own services. When there 
is a change in the agent’s life cycle, the white and yellow pages services are updated and a 
copy mechanism is triggered in order to maintain the consistency among local 
administrators. The system includes a single FIPA compatible communication port, which 
communicates and receives queries from other systems using FIPA ACL (Agent 
Communication Language). 
BESA is formed by container instances, each one belongs to the same group and they share 
the same IP address and a multicast port. Each event can reach any agent located on any 
container of the group, and notify the group members if some change has happened in the 
life cycle of the container or the agent. In this way, in order to implement a Laocoonte’s 
collector agent, it must be located inside a container. The collector agent can monitor any 
kind of traffic (TCP. UDP, ICMP), but the agent must be specialized in only one kind. The 
collector agent filters and identifies suspicious events, then sending this information to its 
correspondent transceiver. Theses collector agents are located in the bottom of the 
architecture, one or several of them can be located on a container verifying the same o 
different kinds of traffic. 
Transceivers are located in the middle layer of the architecture and they must be located 
inside a container. It can only exist one in each container. The transceiver has the local view 
of what is happening in the system, meaning that the transceiver is capable of identifying an 
intrusion in the host in which it is located. The transceiver must execute information 
correlation functions, based on the information gathered from the collector agents which in 
turn are managed by the collector agent (create, activate, sleep or delete). 
The Monitor is an agent located on the highest level of the architecture; it is also located in a 
container. There is only one Monitor for each network segment and it controls all the 
transceivers in the network segment. The Monitor also executes correlation functions, but to 
a higher level than the transceivers, by filtering the information the Monitor gathers from 
the transceiver in its network segment. A Monitor can detect if an distributed attack or 
intrusion are being performed on the system. Eventually some Monitors could depend on 
other monitors in order to give some scalability to the system. At the root level (the highest 
level of the architecture), there must be at least two Monitors, in order that they could verify 
each other. 
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The CIA agents are generated by a Monitor and they have the mission of requesting the 
marks to each transceiver. The CIA agent is a mobile agent which is moving through 
network segments. When a CIA agent reaches a container, it must verify its identity 
requesting a hash function. This hash function corresponds to the sub-marks matrix of the 
transceiver; in this the container ensures that the CIA agent is not a malicious agent.  
At the highest level of the architecture every Monitor must generate a CIA agent in order to 
verify other monitors at its same level, executing a cross verification. 
7. Conclusions 
Agents are appropriate entities to define an IDS, but they have inherent security risk due to 
its nature. These risks must be controlled in an efficient way in order to avoid interferences 
with the proper function of the system. 
An IDS is a security tool which is one of the first barriers reached by an intruder, thus 
becoming a potential target of attack, it must also be configured in such a way that avoids 
the production of false positive and false negative alerts, it also must incorporate security 
techniques in order to avoid malfunctioning of the internal entities of the system. 
With the proposed mark verification technique, using module arithmetic, the use of public 
key cryptography is avoided, reducing the integrity verification of the agents to simple 
mathematical operations. It also avoids overloading of the system and obtains acceptable 
response times for the IDS. 
Accordingly to the proposed technique, if the sub-marks matrix grows, and the number of 
requested sub-marks also grows, the probability of being attacked is close to zero, making 
the deduction of requested or answered information by an attacker almost impossible. 
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